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Abstract: 
 
This paper investigates some examples of Baconian experimentation, coming from Bacon’s ‘scientific’ 
works, i.e. his Latin natural histories and the posthumous Sylva Sylvarum. I show that these experiments 
fulfill a variety of epistemic functions. They have a classificatory function, being explicitly used to 
delimitate and define new fields of investigation. They also play an important role in concept formation. 
Some of the examples discussed in this paper show how Francis Bacon developed instruments and 
technologies for the production of new phenomena, using them subsequently to define new concepts. In 
some other cases, experiments can also play and important role in modeling natural phenomena. In 
examining the role and functions of Baconian experimentation, this paper uses common topics in 
philosophy of the scientific experiment. With this, it attempts to bridge the gap between the more historical 
Baconian studies and the contemporary philosophy of science. My examples are chosen with two purposes. 
On the one hand I intend to show that Bacon was fully aware of the diversity of epistemic functions 
experiments can play in the process of discovery. On the other hand, these examples are also chosen with 
the purpose of illustrating a somewhat more general claim, namely that a thorough investigation of Bacon’s 
natural and experimental histories can unveil a more complex picture of the relations between theory and 
experiment than it has been usually assumed.  
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 Francis Bacon has often been called a “philosopher of experiment”1 and the father 
of experimental science,
2
 however, his philosophy of experiment has always been subject 
of fierce debates.
3
 He was both criticized for paying too much attention to observation 
and experiment, and for failing to see the role of hypotheses in science,
4
 and for not being 
experimental enough, for dealing almost exclusively with a non-distinct mixture of 
                                                 
1
 Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in Philosophy of Science, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983, 246-247. 
2
 This was the first reception and reputation of Francis Bacon in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. He 
was almost unanimously praised for having ‘disciplined’ experience and for having set the ‘plan’ and 
‘model’ of a scientific society. His scientific reputation remained high in the eighteenth-century. The article 
on “Baconisme ou philosophie de Bacon” in the Enyclopedie (ii. 8-10) stressed that “ personne, avant le 
chancelier Bacon, n'avoit connu la Philosophie expérimentale; & de toutes les expériences physiques qu'on 
a faites depuis lui, il n'y en a presque pas une qui ne soit indiquée dans ses ouvrages.” Although 
fragmentary and selective, the eighteenth century reception of Bacon focused on his ‘experimental works’ 
and on his projects to ground natural philosophy on a well organized and well founded natural history. See 
Antonio Perez Ramos, Francis Bacon’s Idea of Science and the Maker’s Knowledge Tradition, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press., 1988, Antonio Perez Ramos, Francis Bacon and the Disputations of the Learned, 
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 42,  1991, 577-588, Graham Rees, Reflections on the 
reputation of Francis Bacon’s philosophy, Huntington Library Quarterly 65, 2002,  379-394. At the end of 
the eighteenth century, Condorcet also credited Bacon for discovering “the true method for studying 
nature.” See Antonio Perez-Ramos, Francis Bacon and the Disputations of the Learned, British Journal for 
the Philosophy of Science, 42, 1991, 577-588 p. 210. In nineteenth century, this way of reading Francis 
Bacon changed, shifting towards his epistemology and his alleged plans for an ‘inductive science.’ John 
Herschel and William Wheewel (and to some extent John Stuart Mill as well) have transformed Bacon into 
the forefather of modern inductive science. See Antonio Perez Ramos,  Francis Bacon’s Idea of Science 
and the Maker’s Knowledge Tradition, 20-27, Richard Yeo, An Idol of the Market-Place: Baconianism in 
19
th
 century Britain, History of Science 23 (1985) 251-98. 
3
 For a discussion of the  conflicting views on Francis Bacon’s philosophy of experiment in the twentieth 
century see Perez Ramos, Francis Bacon’s Idea of Science and the Maker’s Knowledge Tradition,  28-31, 
270-285, Paolo Rossi, Ants, Spiders, Epistemologists, in M. Fattori, Francis Bacon: Terminologia e 
fortuna, Rome: Edizzioni del Ateneo,1984,  245-260. For the view treating Bacon’s experimentalism as a 
‘myth’ fabricated by the Early Royal Society see Michel Malherbe, 14. Malherbe, L’induction baconienne : 
de l’echec metaphysique a l’echec logique, in M. Fattori, Francis Bacon: Terminologia e fortuna, Rome: 
Edizzioni del Ateneo, 1984, 179-200. 
4
 This is the classical line of attack launched in the early twentieth century by Karl Popper and continued by 
Popper’s students.  On the side of the historians of science, the received view was shaped in many ways by 
the seminal article of Thomas Kuhn, Mathematical versus Experimental Traditions in the Development of 
Physical Sciences, in T. Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change, 
Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1977,  31-65. Kuhn introduced the sharp divide between “mathematical 
sciences” and “Baconian sciences” and characterized the latter as being pre-paradigmatic, exploratory and 
fact-gathering activities. This label stuck in Baconian studies. So much so that there is a considerable 
amount of literature treating Bacon’s natural history as a mere repository of facts, the result of a 
painstaking fact-gathering.  See Lorraine Daston, Marvelous Facts and Miraculous Evidence in Early 
Modern Europe, Critical Inquiry 11, 1991, 93-124, Paula Findlen,  Francis Bacon and the Reform of 
Natural History in the Seventeenth Century. In D.R. Kelley, (Ed.), History and the Disciplines. The 
Reclassification of Knowledge in Early Modern Europe, Rochester, 1997,  239-261. For the opposite view 
on Francis Bacon’s natural philosophy see Peter Urbach, Francis Bacon’s Philosophy of Science, La Salle, 
Illinois: Open Court, 1987 and Antonio Perez-Ramos, Francis Bacon’s Idea of Science and the Maker’s 
Knowledge Tradition. For a quite different view on Francis Bacon’s natural history see the articles in the 
special issue Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early Modern Philosophy edited by Sorana 
Corneanu, Guido Giglioni, Dana Jalobeanu, Early Science and Medicine 17, 2012. 
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reports, hearsay, and other empirical materials gathered primarily from secondary 
sources.
5
 Until very recently, the widespread view that Bacon did not actually perform 
relevant experiments but was merely a fact-gatherer and collector of curiosities, coupled 
with the dominant hypothetico-deductive view of science, made Francis Bacon’s 
sophisticated methodology of experimentation literally ‘invisible’ for many historians 
and philosophers of science.
6
 Even when some of the historians set out to investigate 
Bacon’s ways of performing experiments, they tended to confine their examples to 
Bacon’s most obviously methodological work, the Novum Organum, neglecting his more 
‘scientific’ and experimental works: the Latin natural histories and the posthumous Sylva 
Sylvarum.
7
 As a result, even when recognizing the central role of experimentation in 
Bacon’s writings, researchers did not always agree on the precise role experiments were 
supposed to play with respect to the more speculative aspects of Baconianism.  
Attempts have been made to read Bacon in a purely inductivist manner, claiming that 
he always begun by gathering observations and experiments, establishing some theory-
                                                 
5
 This is also one of the ‘received views’ and ‘idols’ of Baconian scholarship. It originates in the 
nineteenth-century in the criticism of Justus Liebig and it was taken over (albeit in a more nuanced manner) 
by Bacon’s Victorian biographer and editor, James Spedding. Nowadays the discussion is centered on the 
status of experiments and experimental reports in Francis Bacon’s natural histories. See Dana Jalobeanu, 
The Philosophy of Francis Bacon’s Natural history: A Research Program, Studii de stiinta si cultura, 23, 
2010, 18-37, Dana Jalobeanu, Core experiments, natural histories and the art of experientia literata: the 
meaning of Baconian experimentation, Society and Politics 10, 2011, 88-104, Dana Jalobeanu, The Four 
Idols of Baconian Scholarship, Procedia - Social and Behavioral Science 2013 (forthcoming). For a 
different view on Baconian experimentalism but a very informed discussion of the reception of Bacon’s 
works in the second part of the seventeenth-century see Guido Giglioni, How Bacon became Baconian, in 
Sophie Roux and Daniel Garber eds. The Mechanization of Natural Philosophy. New York: Springer, 2013 
(forthcoming). 
6
 For a discussion see Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1983. 
7
 The same happened with the scholars interested in the epistemology of experiment. See Marta Fattori, 
Experientia-experimentum: une comparaison entre les corpus latin et anglais, in Marta Fattori, Etudes sur 
Francis Bacon, Paris, PUF, 169-187 for a view saying that Bacon’s natural histories are not relevant for 
Bacon’s epistemology and methodology of experimentation, because they are merely ‘examples’. See also 
Didier Deleule, Experientia-experimentum ou le mthe du culte de l’experience chez Francis Bacon, in in M. 
Fattori, Francis Bacon: Terminologia e fortuna, Rome: Edizzioni del Ateneo,1984, 59-72. It is especially 
highly relevant that one of the most intriguing ‘experimental’ works of Francis Bacon, the posthumous 
Sylva Sylvarum (1626) considered by many of the seventeenth-century naturalists as no less than a 
handbook of experiments, experimental ideas and suggestions has been almost neglected by the twentieth 
century Baconian studies (or by the philosophers of science, for that matter). Even Hacking’s attempt to 
recuperate Bacon’s philosophy of experiment is conducted almost solely with examples coming from 
Novum organum. The same is valid for Lisa Jardine’s seminal article on Francis Bacon’s experientia 
literata. See Lisa Jardine, Experientia literata or Novum organum: Bacon’s two scientific methods? In W. 
Sessions, ed., The Legacy of Francis Bacon, AMS Press, New York, 1990, p.47-67.   For a discussion of 
the reasons of this curious neglect see Graham Rees, An Unpublished Manuscript by Francis Bacon: Sylva 
Sylvarum Drafts and Other Working Notes,  Annals of Science 38, 1981,  377-412. 
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free facts and constructed from them, through some sort of inductive reasoning, axioms 
and laws.
8
 There were also attempts to read Bacon as a hypothetico-deductivist: as 
starting with conjectures and theoretical statements and using experiments to test, 
confirm or reject theoretical statements.
9
 Yet other attempts picture Bacon as a proto-
Bayesian: as using experiments to amass evidence for a more probable conjecture and 
amend his theory accordingly.
10
 Other scholars hold that Bacon was first and foremost a 
speculative philosopher, in the tradition of Renaissance vitalism (best expressed in the 
work of Bernardino Telesio) and cosmological thinking. As a consequence, these 
scholars tend see Bacon’s ‘experiments’ as simply illustrating his appetitive and 
pneumatic matter theory.
11
 Last but not least, there are the ways of reading Bacon 
centered upon his rhetoric: his natural history and discourse about the importance of 
experiments are seen in this case as purely rhetorical devices for realizing the societal and 
communitarian program of Instauratio Magna.
12
 
In this paper I would like to avoid any attempt to present a unified picture of the role 
and purpose of Baconian experimentation. Instead, I investigate some examples of 
Baconian experimentation, coming from the Latin natural histories and the posthumous 
Sylva Sylvarum. In doing this, I will have a closer look at the types of questions Bacon 
developed with the help of some such experiments, emphasizing their diversity and their 
                                                 
8
 For a thorough critique of this ‘Popperian’ view of Bacon see Antonio Perez-Ramos,  Francis Bacon’s 
Idea of Science and the Maker’s Knowledge Tradition, 270-285. However, a version of the ‘inductivist’ 
Bacon is still held by Lorrine Daston, Marvelous Facts and Miraculous Evidence in Early Modern Europe, 
Critical Inquiry 11, 1991, 93-124. 
9
 Peter Urbach, Francis Bacon’s Philosophy of Science. 
10
 L.J. Cohen, Some historical remarks on Francis Bacon’s Conception of Probability, 41, 1980, 219-231,  
Silvia Manzo, Probability, Certainty, and Facts in Francis Bacon’s Natural Histories: A Double Attitude 
against Skepticism. In Neto, Maia; Raimundo, José; Paganini, Gianni and Laursen, John Christian (eds.), 
Skepticism in the Modern Age: Building on the Work of Richard Popkin. Leiden: Brill, pp. 123-137. 
11
 This is the direction in which some of the work of Graham Rees is pointing (although he also has more 
nuanced articles regarding Bacon’s experimental works). See Graham Rees, Matter Theory: A Unifying 
Factor in Bacon’s Natural Philosophy, Ambix 24, 1977, 110-125, Graham Rees, Bacon’s Speculative 
Philosophy, in M. Peltonen, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Bacon,  Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 1993, 121-145.  More straightforwardly belonging to this direction are a couple of seminal papers by 
Guido Giglioni. See for example, Guido Giglioni, Mastering the Appetites of Matter: Francis Bacon’s 
Sylva Sylvarum, in C. T. Wolfe, O. Gal, (Eds.) The Body as Object and Instrument of Knowledge: 
Embodied Empiricism in Early Modern Science, Dordrecht: Springer, 2010, 149-167, Guido Giglioni, 
Reading Nature without making a Book of It: Francis Bacon Novum organum, in P. Hummel, ed.,  Mélivres 
/ Misbooks. Études sur l’envers et les travers du livre, Paris: Philologicum, 2009, 55-70. 
12
 This is also a direction of interpretation originating in the nineteenth century criticism of Justus Liebig, 
which proved to be surprisingly enduring. See Justus Liebig, Lord Bacon, translated by P.A. Chickhachev, 
Paris, 1866 (translation of: Ueber Francis Bacon von Verulam und die methode der naturforschung, 
Muenchen, 1863). 
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continuous interplay with methodological and technical questions relating to the 
experimental set-up, instruments and to the variations of the experiment itself. I intend to 
show that in the examples presented, experiments fulfill a variety of epistemic functions. 
They have a classificatory function and they are explicitly used to delimitate and define 
new fields of investigation. In some cases, Bacon developed instruments and 
technologies for the production of new phenomena and he used them to define new 
concepts. In some other cases, experiments played the role of artificial models of natural 
phenomena. I will show that Bacon used strings of experiments, experimental techniques 
and exploratory experimental strategies in the process of concept formation and 
modeling. These and similar issues are common topics in the recent philosophy of the 
scientific experiment.
13
 In the current investigations the history of these topics is often 
traced back to Francis Bacon,
14
 however, such genealogy is rarely more than mere lip-
service and name-dropping. With very few exceptions, the new experimentalists were not 
interested in reading Bacon and even those that did confined their discussions and 
examples to the list of ‘prerogative instances’ developed by Francis Bacon in Novum 
organum. 
15
 What I propose in terms of examples are experiments included in Bacon’s 
natural historical works, often within more elaborated strings of experiments generated 
with the help of the ‘rules’ and ‘modes’ of experientia literata. My examples are chosen 
with two purposes. On the one hand I intend to show that Bacon was fully aware of the 
diversity of epistemic functions experiments can play in the process of discovery. On the 
other hand, these examples are also chosen with the purpose of illustrating a somewhat 
more general claim, namely that a thorough investigation of Bacon’s natural and 
experimental histories can unveil a more complex picture of the relations between theory 
and experiment than it has been usually assumed.  
 
 
                                                 
13
 See for example Friedrich Steinle, Entering New Fields: Exploratory Uses of Experimentation, 
Philosophy of Science 64 (1997) S65-S67, C.Kenneth Waters, The Nature and Context of Exploratory 
Experimentation: An Introduction to Three Case Studies of Exploratory research, History and Philosophy 
of Life Sciences 29 (2007) 257-84. 
14
 See for example Friedrich Steinle, Experiments in History and Philosophy of Science, Perspectives on 
Science 10 (2002), 408-432, Ian Hacking, Representing and intervening. Introductory topics in Philosophy 
of Science, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983. 
15
 Hacking, Representing and intervening, Ch. 5. 
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Additional difficulties: Experimenting with spirits 
 
One of the most problematic aspects of Baconian experimentation comes from the 
unfamiliar way they are supposed to bridge the gap between the invisible, causal level of 
the world and the visible, phenomenal level.   
For the seventeenth-century mechanical philosopher, the way to bridge the gap 
between minute invisible particles and their visible effects is by postulating a 
fundamental similarity between macroscopic/visible phenomena and what happens at the 
microscopic level. Collisions, for example, are relevant from the point of view of the 
experimenter because of the postulate stating that in the visible and invisible world, 
particles or macroscopic bodies collide in the same way, like billiard balls. Hence, it is 
relevant to study the macroscopic collisions and investigate the empirical laws governing 
this phenomenon. 
In Bacon’s non-mechanical and vitalistic philosophy, however, no such postulate of 
similarity is at work. There is no reason to believe that the invisible spirits trapped in 
bodies act in any way similar with the macroscopic bodies we can see and experience. As 
it has been shown time and again, Bacon divides matter into two classes: tangibles and 
pneumaticals, the latter category being referred to with the common name ‘spirit’. The 
spirits are the active, causal ‘part’ of matter producing all the visible effects physics is 
supposed to describe and explain. Tangible matter is ‘sluggish’ and inert and it is a source 
of action only insofar as it is ‘inhabited’ by various kinds of spirits. Meanwhile, at the 
spiritual (pneumatic level), matter is forever in a state of war: spirits are active, animated 
by appetites, and engaged in a continuous struggle.
16
 They fight each other and prey on 
matter, and their appetites and motions are the ultimate causes of all physical phenomena. 
What all the following examples have in common is that they are said to be experiments 
performed with/on this particular form of matter. It is this form of matter which, 
according to Bacon, is responsible for producing effects in the natural world. Spirits are 
                                                 
16
 On Bacon’s appetitive theory of matter see Guido Giglioni, Mastering the Appetites of Matter: Francis 
Bacon’s Sylva Sylvarum, Graham Rees, Francis Bacon’s Speculative Philosophy, Graham Reees, Atomism 
and Subtlety in Francis Bacon’s Philosophy, Annals of Science 37, 1980, 549-571. See also Sophie Weeks, 
Francis Bacon and the Art-Nature Distinction, Ambix 54, 2007, 101-129. 
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“the most active of bodies” (SS I, 98) and it is from spirits “and their motions” that the 
majority of processes proceed: “rarefaction, colliquation, concoction, maturation, 
putrefaction, vivification and most of the effects of nature” (SS I, 98, HVM, OFB XIII 
348-9 adding ‘liquefaction’ and ‘arefaction’ to the list). All properties of bodies arise, 
Bacon claims, from the ‘appetites and desires’ of pneumatic matter.17 No wonder, 
therefore, that Bacon claims that every investigator of nature should begin with questions 
such as: 
 
 in every body we must investigate how much of it is spirit and how much 
tangible matter; and whether the spirit itself is plentiful and swelling or scanty 
and starved; whether thinner or thicker; more airy or fiery; active or idle; robust 
or insubstantial; advancing or retreating; cut off or continuous, agreeing or 
disagreeing with external and ambient bodies etc. (NO, OFB XI, 213)
18
 
 
How can one operate such an investigation into the relative proportion and 
interactions between spirits and matter? It is here where the experimenter is called upon 
to play an important role. His is the task to ‘measure’ the relative quantities of spirits and 
matter and to find ways to ‘measure’ the actions and effects of all the appetites, desire 
and motions of spirits. The proper objects of philosophy, the “principles, fountains, 
causes and forms of motions, that is, the appetites and passions of every kind of matter” 
(OFB V, 246) are to be investigated throughout an experimental procedure sometimes 
pictured as chaining Proteus and hence obliging matter to change shape and reveal its 
secrets.
 
 
 
… we should investigate those appetites and inclinations of things by which all 
that variety of effects and changes which we see in the works of nature and art is 
made up and brought about. And we should try to enchain Nature, like Proteus; 
for the right discovery and distinctions of the kinds of motions are the true bonds 
                                                 
17
 OFB V, 431-2. 
18
 See the list of abbreviations at the end of the paper. My quotes from Bacon will follow The Oxford 
Francis Bacon  (OFB) unless otherwise stated. The exception is Sylva Sylvarum for which we still have to 
rely on the nineteenth century edition of Spedding, Ellis and Heath, hereafter SEH. 
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of Proteus. For according as motions, that is, incentives and restraints, can be 
spurred on or tied up, so follows conversion and transformation of matter itself. 
(Cogitationes, OFB 5, 425) 
 
Experimenting with matter or chaining Proteus means, in fact, experimenting with 
spirits, reaching, through experiments, to the sources of motion and causation that lies 
behind all the processes and phenomena.
19
 However, this process is fraught with 
difficulties. First, most spirits are ‘rare’, subtle and invisible: we cannot ‘see’ them. 
Second, although they are highly active, it is not entirely clear how we can measure this 
activity, other than through its visible effects in the world of bodies surrounding us. 
Thirdly, Bacon insists that spirits are different in almost every way from the tangible 
bodies.  
Here, an example might be useful to illustrate some theoretical and practical 
consequences of Bacon’s views: 
 
Take a glass, and put water into it, and wet your finger, and draw it round about 
the lip of the glass, pressing it somewhat hard; and after you have drawn it some 
few times about, it will make the water frisk and sprinkle up in a fine dew. (SS 
I.9, SEH II 342) 
 
Bacon sees this simple experiment as ‘demonstrating’ the force of compression present in 
every solid body. It is a visible effect of an appetite of spirits to react to external 
compression: 
 
For whensoever a solid body… is pressed, there is an inward tumult in the parts 
thereof, seeking to deliver themselves from the compression… Wherein it is 
strange in the highest degree, that this motion hath never been observed nor 
                                                 
19
 There are many passages where Bacon emphasizes that the real and relevant questions regarding the 
nature of matter and its processes relate to the appetites, desires and passions of the spirits enclosed in 
tangible bodies and not to the tangible bodies per se. For example: Sylva, 846, SEH II 618. 
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inquires; it being of all motions the most common, and the chief root of all 
mechanical operations. (ibid., SEH II 342) 
 
This motion is one of the fundamental motions of pneumatical matter, the motion of 
liberty. In this particular experiment, the inquirer of nature is however observing an effect 
of the motion of liberty in a particular experimental set up where its effects become 
visible. Although this is a motion present in every body, it is only in liquids that this 
motion can be made visible; at least this is Bacon’s interpretation of the observation that 
all “liquors stricken make round circles” (SEH II 342). Hence, the explanation of the 
experiment is the following: 
 
…the pressure of the finger, furthered by wetting (because it sticketh so much 
the better unto the lip of the glass) after some continuance, putteth all the small 
parts of glass into work, that they strike the water sharply; from which 
percussion that sprinkling cometh. (SEH II 342) 
 
In other words, Bacon seeks to explain the visible effect of this simple experiment (tiny 
droplets of water will sprinkle the glass about the water level in a “fine dew”) by 
appealing to a universal and invisible motion under pressure – or, rather, reaction to 
pressure. He sees this tendency to react to being compressed or constrained in any way as 
a universal property of matter. In the example above, the pressure of the finger upon the 
brim of the glass has ‘awaken’ this reaction in the particles of the glass which in turn are 
acting against the water and produce the same reaction in the liquid.  The tiny droplets of 
water ‘rising’ on the glass are a ‘measure’ of this inner motion present in each body 
which Bacon calls ‘motion of liberty’. It is clear why one can be tempted to say that 
experiments play for Bacon a simple illustrative role of his speculative matter theory; that 
they are devices (arguably rhetorical devices) to make visible the (effects of the) 
processes of nature. In this case, the experiment is making visible the hidden motion of 
liberty present in liquids. Meanwhile, the above experiment does not stand alone; it is one 
 10 
in a series of experiments dealing with the motion of liberty.
20
 If some of them are 
‘illustrative,’ some are clearly moving beyond the task of mere ‘illustrating’ effects of the 
motion of liberty into inquiring how various bodies (and implicitly spirits) behave under 
pressure. They are asking, for example, what is the precise way in which various kinds of 
bodies (solid, liquid, gaseous, sounds etc.) attempt to ‘restore’ and ‘release’ themselves 
from pressure. Is the tendency to move ‘round’ until an escape is found, also present in 
solids, in mixtures, such as gunpowder, in spiritual or inflamed bodies? The last 
experiment in the series is extending the ‘results’ obtained in the various ‘illustrations’ of 
the motion of liberty beyond the mere motions of matter into the production of sounds. 
 
This motion upon pressure is excellently also demonstrated in sounds; as when 
one chimeth upon a bell, it soundeth; but as soon as he layeth his hand upon it, 
the sound ceaseth: and so, the sound of a virginall string, as soon as the quill of 
the jack fallen upon it, stoppeth. For these sounds are produced, by the subtle 
percussion of the minute parts of the bell, or string, upon the air;  all one, as the 
water is caused to leap by the subtile percussion of the minute parts of the glass, 
upon the water… For you must not take it to be, the local shaking of the bell, or 
string, that doth it.  
 
In other words, for Bacon, what produces the sound is ultimately the motion of liberty; on 
percussion, the inner motion of liberty causes the particles of the bell (or string) to move 
in a direction contrary to that of percussion and to ‘reach outside,’ acting on the 
surrounding air. The above experiment shows that this is so because if one touches the 
bell, interposing his hand between the bell (or string) and the outer air, the sound ceases. 
The same experiment is used to correct what Bacon claims is a “wonderful Errour 
amongst Men” who take the persistence of every sound (once the percussion has ceased) 
to mean a “Continuance of the First Sound; whereas (in truth) it is a Renovation, and not 
a Continuance.” (SS III 207, SEH II 415-6). From the fact that if one touches the bell 
with the hand, the sound ceased, one has to infer that the persistence of sounds in general 
                                                 
20
 Called Experiments in consort touching the motion of bodies upon their pressure, SEH II 342-343. On 
the motion of liberty see Novum organum OFB XI 385-387. 
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is due not to a ‘persistence’ of the effects of percussion, but to a renewed action of the 
particles of the bell upon the surrounding air. 
 To sum up, Bacon ascribes to the above experiments a series of epistemic 
functions: they ‘illustrate’ and ‘demonstrate’ the motion of liberty, but they also inquire 
into the particular ways in which this universal motion acts (or the effects it has) in solid, 
liquid, gaseous and flamy bodies (without formulating a common hypotheses as a result 
of this inquiry). Another function of the experiments discussed above is to contradict 
common opinions and prejudices regarding the nature and behavior of sounds. Last but 
not least, they are also employed in the formulation of a generic working definition for 
the motion of liberty as the ‘attempt’ of every body to react to pressure (including 
percussion) and ‘tensure’ (SS I 12 SEH II 342-3). Such a diversity of epistemic functions 
is by no means unusual in Bacon’s natural histories, as I will show in the next sections. 
 
 
Multiple uses of an instrument and concept formation 
 
In a series of papers I have tried to show that in many cases Bacon devised 
experiments in an ordered series, through a process very similar to what has been 
sometimes called “exploratory experimentation”, i.e. through an orderly variation of the 
experimental parameters.
21
 Sometimes, this process of exploratory experimentation aims 
simply at understanding more about a novel process or effect observed in nature. Some 
other times it fulfills more complex epistemic functions, such as classification or, to use 
Steinle’s phrase, “the formation of classificatory and conceptual frameworks.”22 
Sometimes, what generates the process is an interesting instrument, such as calendar 
glass, or the weather glass (vitrum calendare). Here is how Bacon describes the 
instrument: 
 
                                                 
21
 Jalobeanu, The Philosophy of Francis Bacon’s Natural history, Jalobeanu, Core experiments, natural 
histories and the art of experientia literata. See also Dana Jalobeanu, The Hunt of Pan: Francis Bacon’s art 
of experimentation and the foundations of science, Zeta Books 2013 (forthcoming). For the notion of 
exploratory experimentation see  Steinle, Experiments in history and philosophy of science and Steinle, 
Entering New Fields: Exploratory Uses of Experimentation. 
22
 Steinle, Exploratory uses of experimentation, S71. 
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….take a glass with a concave belly, a thin and elongated neck; turn it upside 
down and lower it belly up and mouth down into another glass vessel holding 
water, with the mouth of the inserted glass touching the bottom of the vessel 
receiving it, and the neck of the first glass leaning a little against the mouth of 
the second, so that it can stand up – and to achieve this more conveniently, put a 
little wax on the mouth of the second glass…  (OFB XI 249-251) 
 
Next, Bacon explains the functioning of this instrument: the upper glass is heated before 
being reversed and fixed in the lower glass. When cooling down, it ‘draws’ the water on 
its long neck. In this inverted glass device, one can see the ascent and descent of the 
water and one can even attach a measuring scale to the instrument: 
 
Now a long, narrow scale should be attached to the glass and graduated as one 
chooses. Then, as the day’s weather gets warmer or colder, you will see the air 
contract into a smaller space with cold and expand into a larger with heat, as can 
be made out by the water rising when the air contracts and falling or being 
pushed down when it expands. (OFB XI 251) 
 
One use of such a device is to measure changes taking place in the air. The weather glass, 
claims Bacon in Historia densi et rari “as far as heat and cold are concerned, 
demonstrates the varieties and degrees of the weather so nicely”(OFB XIII 89).  Of all 
other bodies and most of the spirits “air is the body which takes in and gives off heat 
most readily” (OFB XI 249): 
 
The air’s sense, as far as hot and cold is concerned, is so much subtle and 
exquisite that it far surpasses our faculty of touch, so much so that a sun-beam, 
or the heat of the breath or even more the heat of the hand placed on top of the 
glass, immediately and manifestly makes the water sink. (OFB XI 251)
 23
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 See also: OBF XIII 89 
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This weather-glass or calendar glass occurs many times in Bacon’s natural and 
experimental histories and gives rise to a number of different experiments.
24
 As it is often 
the case, the weather glass itself is not Bacon’s own invention. In fact, at the time it 
gained such a prominence in Bacons’ writings, the calendar glass was already featuring in 
other natural histories of the period.
25
 As Arianna Borelli has shown, unlike his 
predecessors Giovanni Battista della Porta, Giovanni Battista Benedeti and Cornelius 
Drebbel, Bacon transformed what was a “temporary experimental set-up” into a 
permanent device/instrument, the vitrum calendare.
26
 He also used this instrument in a 
variety of ways, going beyond treating it as a simple device to ‘measure’ the ways in 
which air receives or gives away heat and cold. And he did this through and exploratory 
experimentation.
27
 In a series of experiments, Bacon played with the elements of the 
weather-glass in order to identify the relevant parameters in such experiments. He begins 
by placing hot and cold substances and materials on the upper part of the calendar glass 
(OFB XIII 89, 107,109, 139). Then, he inquired whether substances that have a cooling 
effect in living beings (without being cold themselves), such as opiates, for example, are 
‘felt’ by the weather glass (SS I 74 371). In HDR he makes a list of “potential heats” 
[caloribus potentialibus], i.e. medicines and other substances producing the dilatation of 
spirits and asks whether one can produce a weather glass sensitive enough to measure 
them. He proposes the following experiment 
 
                                                 
24
 See for example HV, OFB XII, 71, HDR OFB XIII 89, 107, SS I 74, SEH II 371, SS IX 811, SEH II 605 
etc. Weather glass is the term Bacon uses in Sylva Sylvarum for the same device called ‘vitrum calendare’ 
in Novum Organum, Historia ventorum and Historia densi et rari. 
25
 Arianna Borelli, The Weatherglass and its Observers in the Early Seventeenth Century, in Claus Zittel et. 
all, Philosophies of Technology. Francis Bacon and his Contemporaries, Brill, 2008, 67-133. 
26
 Borelli, The Weatherglass and its Observers, 116. 
27
 We can see Bacon’s weather-glass as a device specially set up for exploratory experimentation because it 
allows all sorts of interventions of the experimenter in its design: the change of water with wine or “spirit 
of wine,” for example, the construction of two identical weather-glasses which can be carried around and 
their measured results can be compared etc. According to Steinle, a characteristic feature of exploratory 
experimentation is that it enable investigators to intervene in a variety of ways. See Steinle, Entering new 
fields. For a discussion of other, larger concepts of exploratory experimentation see Ken Waters, The 
Nature and Context of Exploratory Experimentation, p. 2-5. A common definition of exploratory 
experiments is that they are aiming “to generate significant findings about phenomena without appealing to 
a theory about these phenomena for the purpose of focusing experimental attention on a limited range of 
possible findings” (Waters, ibid., 5). For a more general discussion of exploratory experimentation see also 
L.R. Franklin, Exploratory Experiments, Philosophy of Science 72, 2005, 888-899. 
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Take two calendar glasses of the same size. Put water in the one and spirit of 
wine strong and sharp in the other, and so heat the glasses that the water and 
spirit climb to the same height. Put them together and leave them for a while and 
see if the water stands higher than the spirit of wine. For if that is what happens 
it is obvious that the potential heat of the spirit of wine has dilated the air so as 
to push down the spirit of wine. (OFB XIII 109).  
 
Moving beyond the mere sensitivity of the air, Bacon uses two equally calibrated 
weather-glasses to measure (or at least to compare) properties and qualities of weather 
and the disposition of air situated in different places. For this, he uses two ‘identical’ 
weather-glasses and interprets their different results as a measure of the differences in air 
between two different places: 
 
Because it is certain that in some places, either by the nature of the earth, or by 
the situation of woods and hills, the air is more unequal than in others; and 
inequality of air is ever an enemy to health; it were good to take two weather-
glasses, matches in all things, and to set them, for the same hours of one day, in 
several places, where no shade is, nor inclosures; and to mark where you set 
them, how far the water cometh; and to compare them, when you come again, 
how the water standeth then; and if you find them unequal, you may be sure that 
the place where the water is lowest is in the warmer air, and the other in the 
colder. And the greater the inequality be of the ascent or descent of the water, 
the greater is the inequality of the temper of the air. (SS IX 811, SEH II 605). 
 
This experiment uses the weather-glass as a measuring instrument and establishes a long-
term research program (repeated measurements at regulated intervals, during summer and 
winter etc.).
28
  But there are other exploratory manipulations of the weather glass in 
                                                 
28
 See also the testimony of Thomas Bushell and Thomas Tennison about Bacon’s ‘mechanical inventions’ 
among which there was a “Philosophical Glass” destined to “know the Season of every Hour of the Year”. 
See Baconana, or Certaine Genuine Remains of Sir Francis Bacon, London, 1679, 18-19. It is important to 
stress that Bacon does not have a theory about what exactly his weather-glasses are measuring; what are the 
‘qualities’ and ‘virtues’ of the air. He has something different, very similar with what has been recently 
labeled “exploratory research program,” namely a series of research strategies and experimental ideas (of 
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Bacon’s writings. One is quantitative: Bacon asks simply how much can the air inside of 
the weather-glass be rarefied? The regular procedure is to bring water to boil, empty the 
glass and then turn it upside down in the other vessel with cold water. As a result, the 
water will raise and occupy 1/3 of the glass. Can we make the water rising further than 
this? Is it possible to rarefy the air inside of a vessel in such a way that it gets to the same 
degree of rarefaction as the ether or the celestial fire? If we replace the glass with 
stronger materials, iron or bronze, ‘how far the rarefaction could be taken’?  (HDR, OFB 
XIII, 89). The question is left without an answer in HDR, but the experiment is taken 
further, into the direction of other questions. An interesting one relates to the possible 
relations between heat/cold and dense/rare. For example, Bacon asks whether the degree 
of rarefaction has anything to do with the capacity of retaining heat/cold for a longer 
period of time. He also imagines an experiment that would eliminate the parameter ‘heat’ 
and retain only ‘dilatation/condensation’: 
 
It would be well worth while showing by experiment whether air dilated by heat 
could be fixed in that same bulk so that it would not make efforts to restore or 
contract itself. So take a stout calendar glass and heat it strongly; then stop its 
mouth up well so that the air cannot contract again, and leave it stopped up for 
some days. Then put it still stopped up in water, and once it is in the water open 
it up and see how much water it draws in, and whether it draw in as much as it 
would have done if the glass had been put in the water straight away. (OFB XIII 
139) 
 
This experiment points already in the direction of an entirely different field of 
experimentation. Under investigation is a new ‘power’ of the dilated air to draw water. 
The heated and dilated air has the power to push water down or, when it cools down, it 
draws water up. Is this power the same if the dilated air is cooled down in a closed 
recipient? Moreover, this power of drawing water or pushing it down makes the weather-
                                                                                                                                                 
an exploratory nature) which have to be conducted all together in order to learn more about the ‘properties’ 
and ‘virtues’ of the air. Placing weather-glasses in various locations is just one part of such a larger 
program. Other elements of it include studying the growth of similar species of plants and vegetables in 
different locations (for comparative study) and leaving pots of water and pieces of raw meat in the same 
locations for an equal amount of time to study whether the way they putrefy differ.  See SS Century IX. 
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glass a very useful instrument for studying another class of phenomena, that of winds. 
The weather glass is therefore used in HV as a device for producing artificial winds: “In a 
calendar glass dilated air pushes the water down as if it were a breeze” (OFB XII, 71). To 
say that the air in the weather glass behaves as a breeze means, for Bacon, that one can, 
in fact, use the weather glass to produce an artificial wind and, by extension, that one can 
develop devices exploiting the same phenomenon (i.e. the creation of ‘winds’ through 
dilatation and condensation) in order to extend the inquiry into the properties of winds 
properly speaking. Here is how Bacon recounts the experiment: 
 
I have conducted an experiment on this kind of wind in a round tower closed on 
all sides. I placed a brazier in the middle of it with coals well alight so that there 
would be less smoke. But at some distance from a side of the brazier I hung a 
thread with a cross of feathers to make it move more easily. In a short time then, 
when the heat had increased and the air dilated, the cross and its thread were 
stirred back and forth with changeable motion; and when a hole was made in the 
window of the tower, a hot current of air went out, not steadily but intermittently 
and with fluctuating intensity. (OFB XII 71) 
 
A number of very interesting facts are reconstructed here: Bacon generates a wind 
through the same kind of experimental procedure as before: heating up the interior of a 
sealed vessel and producing the ‘swelling’ of the air. He even keeps the geometry of the 
weather-glass: a high hollow space on the top, a source of humidity on the ground, and a 
gradient of temperature.
29
 Currents of convections are formed, hence the feathers are 
oscillating. Moreover, when we open the closed vessel/tower, blasts of hot air are getting 
out.  
This “tower experiment” is discussed a couple of times along the HV, with interesting 
variations of the experimental conditions. Bacon replaces the brazier first with a boiling 
kettle, so that hot vapors are released in the enclosed tower. What happens is that the 
feathers are moved “more weakly and lazily”. He then uses both the brazier with burning 
                                                 
29
 In the first version of the experiment the humid vapors enclosed in the tower are put into motion by the 
heat of the brazier. After that, Bacon introduces a separate source of water on the bottom, i.e. a boiling 
kettle. See OFB XII 71, 83.  
 17 
coals and the kettle to produce both a current of hot air and a lot of vapors and, of course, 
the motion of the feathers is more pronounced: “such as that is was sometimes rotated 
upwards as if by a tiny whirlwind, since the water supplied an abundance of vapor which 
the brazier was ready to dissipate” (OFB XII 83). 
By creating artificial winds through this process of exploratory experimentation 
(varying the gradient of heat, introducing an additional source of water etc.), Bacon 
claims to have proven that “the main cause provoking wind motion is the overburdening 
of the air with added air made of vapour.” (OFB XII, 83) He also claims to have shown 
that there is no reason to assume that winds are a particular substance or a virtue of air, as 
the ancients have taught. Instead, one can show, by way of such experiments, that winds 
are simply motions of pneumatics (air, vapors) originating in waters (rivers, sea, clouds) 
and moved around according to the varying degree of density of the surrounding air. In 
this way, the experiment can be said to refute commonly received opinions and the 
current meteorological theories claiming that a wind is ‘more’ than a mere motion of the 
air.
30
 Meanwhile, the experiment establishes a number of interesting provisional 
connections between varying the density of the air, the presence of water and water 
vapors and the variation of temperature (to use modern language).  
In other words, exploratory experimentation is used to establish the relevant 
parameters of an artificial model for studying the winds. At the same time it also is used 
to ‘classify’ various motions of the air produced in the weather-glass and in the tower 
experiment under the general category ‘winds’. A definition is given to these ‘winds’ in 
terms of the parameters identified in the experiments, namely ‘winds’ are motions of the 
air produced by the ‘swelling’ of the atmosphere when vapors of water are added into it. 
Winds originate in ‘nurseries’ of water: rivers, sea, clouds or mere boiling pots can be 
such wind-nurseries.  
 
 
Experiments as models 
 
                                                 
30
 See also Borelli, The Weather-Glass and its Observers. 
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The tower experiment also has a modeling function. In it, we can see, for example, on a 
smaller scale, what Bacon claims to be the case in nature, namely that adding vapors into 
the atmosphere and varying the temperature creates a stronger blast of the air than each of 
the effects separately. By analogy, the presence of a massive quantity of water (such as a 
river or the sea) is a ‘nursery’ for a larger wind and a variation of temperature on a bigger 
scale (like the heat of the sun) will produce similar effects.  
 This modeling aspect is even more striking in another series of experiments 
Bacon referred to throughout his works, i.e. experiments destined to create a table-top 
model of a star. The experiment is described thus: 
 
Take a small wax candle, and put it in a socket of brass or iron; then set it 
upright in a porringer full of spirit of wine heated; then set both the candle and 
spirit of wine on fire, and you shall see the flame of the candle open itself, and 
become four or five times bigger than otherwise it would have been; and appear 
in figure globular, and not in pyramis. You shall see also, that the inward flame 
of the candle keepeth colour, and doth not wax any whit blue towards the colour 
of the outward flame of the spirit of wine. (SS I. 31, SEH II 259) 
 
This flame-in-a-flame experiment is also used in an exploratory manner to ask a number 
of questions about the nature and properties of flame. According to Bacon, this “noble 
instance” shows at least two different things: that flame is a “fixed body” and not a 
‘transitory’ effect, and that its properties are different according to the medium in which 
it burns. Not only that “flame doth not mingle with flame” (unlike air or water) but also 
the shape of flame inside of a flame is different from its shape in the air: 
 
It appeareth also that the form of a pyramis in flame, which we usualy see, is 
merely by accident, and that the air about, by quenching the sides of the flame, 
crusheth it, and extenuatheth it into that form; for of itself it would be round; and 
therefore smoke is in the figure of a pyramis reversed; for the air quencheth the 
flame and receiveth the smoke. Note also, that the flame of the candle, within 
the flame of the spirit of wine, is troubled; and doth not only open and move 
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upwards, but moveth waving, and to and fro; as if flame of his own nature (if it 
were not quenched) would roll and turn, as well as move upwards.(SS I. 31 SEH 
II 352-3). 
 
What we see again in this experimental process is how various aspects of the 
experimental set-up can lead to a number of different questions. One such questions 
relates to the property of flame to ‘mix’ or not with other substances (tangible or 
pneumatic).
31
 The other relates to the ‘natural’ shape of flames being medium-
dependent.
32
 NO offers a variation of the experimental set-up: 
 
…take a small metal vessel and put a lighted wax candle in it; put the vessel in a 
bowl and pour in a fair amount of spirit of wine but not enough to reach the 
vessel’s mouth, and then light the spirit. This latter will give you a more bluish 
flame, the candle light a yellower. Se therefore whether the candle flame… 
keeps its pyramidal form, or whether it does not rather tend to become spherical, 
since nothing can be found there to destroy or compress it. (NO, OFB XI 337-9) 
 
We can presume that in this form the experiment allows some air between the two flames 
(and therefore they are not immediately extinguished). Bacon classifies it as a crucial 
instance destined to “illuminate the question with flames of two colours” (OFB XI 337). 
In other words, the main question of this experiment in this form is to study the shape of 
the flame and to infer some medium-dependence of the flame. If the flame-within-a-
flame is orbicular instead of pyramidal,
33
 it means that the ‘regular’ pyramidal shape of 
flame we are all accustomed to is not a ‘natural’ shape, but merely a result between the 
interaction of the flame and surrounding air. It is here that Bacon’s speculative 
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 Such strings of experiments are developed in SS I 366 ff. (burning spirit of wine mixed with various 
tangible substances and measuring the burning time), SS I 30 (mixing flame with gunpowder and air to 
create blasts). In NO we can also find exploratory experiements directed towards discovering the various 
degrees of heat of different kinds of flames. See NO in OFB XI 245 where Bacon offers an ordered table of 
the power and degree of heat (temperature) of flames extending from spirit of wine (the softest) to 
gunpowder and Greek fire (the highest degree of heat).  Other experiments are investigating the process of 
burning (of various substances) and the shape of the flame. See NO, OFB XI 335. 
32
 See NO OFB XI 265, 269, 337-9. 
33
 The experiment in SS also states that the flame-within-a-flame is five time larger than the same flame 
burning in air. 
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cosmology comes to play a role in the exploratory experimentation. Both the explanation 
of the orbicular shape of the flame-within-a-flame and the modeling aspect of these 
experiments are theory-informed.
34
 This is even more clear when the same experiment is 
propounded as a model; a table-top model of a star. Here is how the experiment 
concludes, in SS: 
 
By all which it should seem that the celestial bodies (most of them) are true fires 
or flames, as the Stoics held; more fine (perhaps) and rarefied than our flame is. 
For they are all globular and determinate; they have rotation; and they have the 
colour and splendor of flame; so that flame above is durable and consistent, and 
in his natural place; but with us is a stranger and momentany, and impure. (SS I 
31, SEH II 353). 
 
This paragraph represents the conclusion of Bacon’s exploratory experimentation with 
the flame-in-a-flame; it claims that there are a number of relevant similarities between the 
parameters of the experiment and the properties of celestial objects. The orbicular flame 
of the model has the same shape and motion ascribed to celestial bodies, it rotates and 
twinkles, it is durable and consistent, spherical and white in color. Are these qualities 
enough to ground the analogical extension of the experimental results from the table-top 
model into a natural history of the heavens? This question is addressed by Bacon in 
another of his writings, DGI, precisely in the context of the ‘proper’ way to develop a 
natural history of the heavens. There the same experiment of the flame-within-the-flame 
is used to develop different questions. One of them is whether one can see lucid objects 
through flames. The traditional two sphere cosmology was answering this question in the 
negative. In fact, the impossibility of seeing a flame-within-a-flame was given as a 
powerful argument against the existence of the ‘enflamed’ ether. Bacon asserts: 
                                                 
34
 They are however not theory-driven. The distinction between exploratory and theory-driven experiments 
focuses on the specific ways in which experiments depends on theory. For example, theoretical 
interventions can be at the level of background knowledge, they can inform the concepts used to describe 
what happens in an experiment etc. For a discussion on the ways in which experiments can be theory 
informed see for example: Michael Heidelberger, Theory-Ladenness and Scientific Instruments in 
Experimentation, in Hans Radder, ed., The Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation, Pittsburgh: University 
of Pittsburgh Press, 2003, 138-151 and Ken Waters, The Nature and Context of Exploratory 
Experimentation. 
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There is, however, no reason why something lucid should not be a transparent 
medium for the transmission of a stronger light… But we see that flame itself is 
a transparent medium, even for transmitting the species of an opaque body, as is 
shown in the wick of candles; much more for transmitting the species of an 
intenser light. Even among flames some are more translucent than others. (DGI 
OFB VI 150-1) 
 
The result of the flame-in-a-flame experiment is in this case refuting a received opinion 
and showing the possibility of conceiving it differently. The experiment also is treated as 
a model, but this time the modeled phenomenon is different: not a star, but the 
phenomenon of aurora borealis – it is thus replicated with the flame-within-a-flame 
experiment. 
 
By the same token, bright beams are quite often seen through the heaven, giving out 
manifest light and markedly illuminating the darkness of the night, through whose bodies 
it is nevertheless possible to see the stars. (DGI OFB VI 151)  
 
This process of modeling is of course not theory-free. However, the relation between 
Bacon’s speculative cosmology and his modeling experiments is not as straightforward as  
usually assumed. The flame-within-a-flame is not a mere illustration of the theory stating 
that there is a fiery ether equally distributed through the universe, carrying with it the 
‘flames’ of the celestial bodies. It is a complex experimental situation fulfilling more than 
one function, and exploited to ask diverse questions regarding the nature of the flame, the 
medium-dependence shape of a flame, the possibility of modeling celestial phenomena 
such as aurora borealis or the telescopic observations of celestial bodies. 
 
Conclusion 
  
As we have seen in the examples above, experiments play more than one role in Bacon’s 
complex construction of natural history. They illustrate and exemplify; they serve as 
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classificatory devices, they are constantly used to put together  – sometimes in a totally 
unexpected manner – phenomena belonging apparently to very different realms under the 
common (working) definitions of concepts such as: ‘winds’, ‘maturation’, ‘desiccation’, 
‘liquefaction’ etc. The principles behind the scheme of classification are provided by 
Bacon’s matter theory and by his methodological rules, developed under the name of 
experientia literata.
35
 If we classify all motions of the air as winds, the device called 
‘weather-glass’ and various experimental variations of the same experimental set-up are 
facilitating the classification process and add unexpected members in the classification 
properly speaking. Moreover, experiments can play the role of the model: in the same 
way (to quote Bacon again) that Aristotle’s politics begins with the ‘model’ of the family, 
artificial models of rainbows through prisms or winds created by bellows can provide a 
smaller-scale and simpler phenomenon to begin our inquiry with. A word of caution, 
however: Bacon’s models are not simplified and idealized versions of the phenomena in 
the same way in which Galileo’s inclined planes are providing models for the free fall. 
Bacon’s artificial models are extremely complex ‘real’ phenomena and not idealized 
reconstructions. Their main use is not to represent a step in the treatment of a larger 
problem. Their main use is to provide ministrations for the senses, intellect and 
imagination. They have a heuristic purpose; they free the mind from received prejudices 
and theories, provide ‘helps’ and ‘instruments’ in the process of discovery, offer 
classificatory schemes and devices, act as instruments in the ‘art’ of questioning nature – 
and much more. Experiments also provide basis for analogy, through modelling. At least 
some Baconian experiments do. This should therefore be a raison de plus to direct our 
inquiry into a more thorough exploration of Baconian experimentation and Baconian 
natural histories. 
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 On Bacon’s experientia literata see also Dana Jalobeanu, The Hunt of Pan, Laura Georgescu, A New 
Form of Knowledge: Experientia Literata, Society and Politics 10, 2011, 104-137 and Jalobeanu, Core 
experiments, natural histories and the art of experientia literata. 
 23 
Leslie Ellis and Douglas Denon Heath. London: Longman, 1857–1874 (facsimile reprint 
Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1961–1963). 
OFB = The Oxford Francis Bacon. (15 vols. planned, 6 vols. to date) General editors: 
Graham Rees and Lisa Jardine (1996–2006); Sir Brian Vickers (2006–). Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
DGI = Descriptio globi intellectualis 
HDR = Historia densi et rari 
HNE = Historia naturalis et experimentalis 
HV = Historia ventorum 
HVM = Historia vitae et mortis 
SS = Sylva Sylvarum 
 
 
 
 
 
 
